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EVOLUTIONARY THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY:
PROVIDING ULTIMATE EXPLANATIONS FOR HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Kyle Gibson

This short essay will elucidate one ofthe main benefits o/using an evolutionary approach when
studying human behavior; the ability to answer questions ultimately.

While conventional methods in
cultural
anthropology
undoubtedly
produce useful fmdings, they are often
proximate and difficult to apply in
general, pan-specific, ways. Over the
last few decades, the incorporation of
evolutionary approaches in anthropology
has begun to help the field over this
hurdle. In the (1992) paper Archaeology
and Evolutionary Science, R.C. Dunnell
explores the nature of archaeological
method and theory using a bottom-up
reevaluation of the ways archaeologists
collect and analyze data. Although his
paper is directed towards archaeologists,
many of his ideas are equally applicable
to all anthropological sub-disciplines.
Dunnell describes a quandary
familiar to all anthropologists when he
points out that archaeology has failed to
gain "scientific" (i.e. "hard science")
status over the last one hundred years.
In reality, this lack of acceptance has had
less to do with the scientific community
as a whole failing to "accept"
archaeology, and anthropology as a
whole, than it has with our own
confusion regarding what type of science
anthropology really is (Dunnell 1992).
This epistemological misstep has led to
the under-use of certain methods and
models in cultural anthropology, most
notably, evolutionary theory.
To clarify what anthropology is,
Dunnell provides an outstanding

overview of the nature of science. First
and foremost, he explains that science
uses theory to explain phenomena.
Second, he notes that science "employs a
uniform epistemological standard, an
empirical or a performance standard"
(ibid). In other words, scientists develop
and test hypotheses via a universally
accepted set of procedures e.g. the
scientific method.
Furthermore, he
reports that there are two distinct types
of science; essential and materialistic.
Examples of essential sciences are
physics and astronomy. Examples of
materialistic .sciences are anthropology
and psychiatry.
The key difference
between the two is that essential sciences
attempt to ascertain "how" things behave
while materialistic ones try to discover
"why" things are (ibid). For example,
physicists can tell us, with great
precision, how nuclear fission functions,
but not necessarily why it exists. There
are even physicists who propose· that
certain quantum events actually do not
have causes (Ebert 2003). Of course, it
is impossible to ascertain why something
happens if it does not have a cause.
Essential sciences like physics
fundamentally possess the ability to
predict the behavior of their "subjects"
(i.e. subatomic particles, planets, et
cetera) with a high degree of certainty
because the circumstances under which
these behaviors can occur are finite and

The Nebraska Anthropologist, vol. 19,2004, pp. 1-3
1

2

THE NEBRASKA ANTHROPOLOGIST

(usually)
directly.
observable.
Materialistic sciences deal with subjects
that are more diverse in their behavior
than those studied in the essential
sciences -- biological entities. Humans
demonstrate an infinite array of
behaviors.
Because of this, the
materialistic scientist's ability to predict
human behavior pales in comparison to
the essential scientist's ability to predict
a planet's. For this reason, there are no
laws in the materialistic sciences as there
are in the essential sciences (Dunnell
1992).
Because anthropology is a
materialistic science, it has always been
theoretically possible for researchers to
explain behavior ultimately. However,
with the exception of large-scale crosscultural surveys, conventional methods
of data collection and analysis in cultural
anthropology have been relatively
unsuccessful doing so. One of the great
benefits of evolutionary approaches such
as human behavioral ecology (HBE) is
that they have wholeheartedly embraced
this previously untapped ability. There
are three central tenants ofHBE are:
1. Behavioral diversity is largely a
result of diversity in the
contemporary
socioecological
environment (rather than in
contemporary variation in genes
or cultural inheritance, or in past
environments).
2. Adaptive relationships between
behavior and environment may
anse from many different
mechanisms; hence HBE is
generally
agnostic
about
mechanisms
(including
the
of
cognitive
question
modularity).
3. Since humans are capable of
rapid
adaptive
shifts
in
phenotype, they are likely to be

[vol. 19, 2004]

well-adapted to most features of
contemporary environments, and
exhibit relatively little adaptive
lag (Smith 2000).
To summarize, HBE posits that; 1)
people act differently largely because
they live in different types of social and
physical environments, 2) the cognitive,
proximate, framework that affects
behavior is already in place (this
assumption is known as the "phenotypic
gambit") and, 3) humans are relatively
to
their
current
well-adapted
environments, whatever they may be.
The first point is the most crucial
to this essay.
It concerns the way
environment
affects
behavior.
Behaviors are often measured in terms of
"effort". These efforts are weighed
against one another in terms of costs
versus benefits in a zero-sum game.
That is to say, the effort that one
provides him or herself cannot, at the
same time, be given to others (Cronk
1991). The individual must weigh the
costs and benefits associated with the
allocation of their effort because it will
ultimately affect their genetic fitness.
This is where the real power of HBE
becomes evident.
HBE views
environmental stimuli, both physical and
social, as precursors to behavior. The
"success" of a behavior is ascertained by
measuring its effect on the actor's
genetic fitness.
In both HBE and
evolution generally, fitness is the
dependent variable. This confluence is
the reason HBE can provide ultimate
explanations for human behavior and
why so many useful models, methods,
and hypotheses have stemmed from it
(for a detailed listing see Cronk 1991).
HBE is just one of several approaches
that embrace evolutionary mechanisms
as explanations for human behavior.
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Others include evolutionary psychology,
dual-inheritance theory, and cognitive
ethology. The combined understanding
these approaches provide us may soon
revolutionize the way we view culture.
This
essay
details
where
evolutionary approaches in anthropology
can be classified in the scientific world
writ large. Using human behavioral
ecology as one example, it illuminates
one of the major benefits of
incorporating such approaches III
cultural anthropology; the ability to
resolve questions ultimately.
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